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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Section 77B-Constitutionality of Subsection (b) (5) of
Section 77B of Bankruptcy Act-Debtor corporation, having been in receiv-
ership for two years, immediately prior to the final hearing at which an order
for the sale of assets and the termination of the receivership was expected, filed
a petition I under section 77B 2 of the Bankruptcy Act and submitted three
plans of reorganization which were opposed by all the secured creditors and by a
large part of the unsecured. The debtor finally sought to obtain confirmation
of the last plan under subsections (e) (I) (c) 3 and (b) (5) 4 providing for
confirmation despite the disapproval of more than one-third of a class of affected
creditors. Held, subsection (b) (5) was unconstitutional,5 because it violated
the Fifth Amendment by taking property without due process of law.6 In re
Tennessee Publishing Co., C. C. H. Bankruptcy Service § 3834 (C. C. A. 6th,
Feb. 13, 1936).
The problem of the constitutionality of subsection (b) (5) of § 77B 7
may arise in either of two situations, the instant case representing the one in
i. The petition was instigated by an individual who had that day secured control of the
corporation by purchasing all of the common stock at a time when it seemed doubtful whether
the shareholders had any equities left.
2. 48 STAT. 912 (I934), II U. S. C. A. §2o7 (1935).
3. 48 STAT. 918 (934) as amended by 49 STAT. 965, ii U. S. C. A. §207 (e) (1935).
(e) (i) "A plan of reorganization shall not be confirmed until it has been accepted . . .
by or on behalf of creditors holding two-thirds in amount of the claims of each class whose
claims have been allowed and would be affected by the plan . . . Provided, however, That
such acceptance shall not be requisite to the confirmation of the plan by any creditor or
class of creditors . . . (c) if provision is made in the plan for the protection of the inter-
ests, claims, or liens of such creditor or class of creditors in the manner provided in sub-
division (b), clause (5), of this section.
4. 48 STAT. 914 (I934), 1i U. S. C. A. 2ao7 (b) 0935). (b) "A plan of reorganiza-
tion within the meaning of this section . . . (5) shall provide in respect of each class of
creditors of which less than two-thirds in amount shall accept such plan . . . adequate
protection for the realization by them of the value of their interests, claims, or liens, if the
property affected by such interests, claims, or liens is dealt with by the plan, either as
provided in the plan (a) by the transfer or sale of . . . or by the retention of such prop-
erty-by the debtor subject to such interests, claims, or lien; or (b) by a sale free of such
interests, claims, or liens at not less than a fair upset price and the transfer of such inter-
ests, claims, or liens to the proceeds of such sale; or (c) by appraisal and payment either
in cash of the value either of such interests, claims, or liens, or at the objecting creditors'
election, of the securities allotted to such interests, claims, or liens under the plan, if any
shall be so allotted; or (d) by such method as will in the opinion of the judge, under and
consistent with the circumstances of the particular case, equitably and fairly provide such
protection . . . "
5. Although the court began by saying that under the proposed plan it was concerned
only with clauses (c) and (d) of (b) (5) and although its discussion seemed to be lim-
ited to these provisions, it, nevertheless, broadly concluded that (b) (5) was unconstitu-
tional as a whole.
6. The court apparently considered itself bound by the Supreme Court decision holding
the Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U. S. 555 (1935). That decision reversed the holding of the instant circuit court in
the same case. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 74 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A.
6th, 1935).
7. That section 77B in its general scope represents a constitutional exercise of the bank-
ruptcy power of Congress has not been seriously disputed. Campbell v. Allegheny Corp.,
75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935), cert. denied 56 Sup. Ct. 92 (1935). It is essentially
the same as section 77 [47 STAT. 1474 (I933), amended by 49 STAT. 911, I1 U. S. C. A.
§205 (1935)], which has been approved by the Supreme Court. Continental Illinois Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648 (1935). Legal writers have
generally given their approval. See Swaine, Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganisa-
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which the minor creditor classes or the shareholders attempt to have a plan of
reorganization confirmed without the consent of the major creditor interests.
In the second, the important classes of creditors are interested in adopting a
plan to which the consent of the requisite two-thirds of certain subordinate
classes can not be obtained. Subsection (b) (5) was probably not intended to
apply to cases falling in the former category 8 and should have been so inter-
preted in this case. The court might either have refused to recognize the pro-
posal advanced as a plan of reorganization at all, or have treated it as one that
was not feasible, in which case the right to file the petition could have been
denied 9 because one element of the good faith requirement' 0 of the Act is the
proof that reorganization is practicable, so that the court will not unnecessarily
occupy itself with a consideration of the plan." Even if a petition had been
granted and such a plan were subsequently evolved, the proceedings could then
have been dismissed if the court thought that a fair, equitable and workable
plan was unlikely to be forthcoming.' 2  However, in the second situation, where
(b) (5) is applicable, serious constitutional questions do present themselves.
Little objection can be found to the protection accorded subordinate classes
under clauses (a) and (b) of the disputed subsection. Under them the rights
of the creditors are fully protected, and the possible delay in enforcement pend-
ing reorganization should not render the law unconstitutional.3 Clause (d) is
probably so vague as to be impossible of application and therefore inoperative,
or else limited to the previous specific provisions.'- Of chief concern is the
important provision for appraisal in part (c). Important practical considera-
tions can be invoked in favor of preventing subordinate creditors, merely be-
cause they represent all or a majority of some relatively unimportant class, from
halting an entire reorganization program and blackmailing the reorganizers into
purchasing the compliance of the dissidents or into buying them out at a price
representing their nuisance value in addition to the fair value of their interests.'
On the other hand, the proposition that possible majorities can be appraised
and their power to participate in the reorganization thus destroyed is a novel one
in the law,1 and since well established property rights 1 will be affected in an
tion: An Affrnuztive View, (1933) i A. B. A. J. 698; Weiner, Corporate Reorganization:
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, (1934) 34 Coi. L. Rwv. 1173; Gerdes, Constitutionality
of 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 196. For the contrary posi-
tion, see Stebbins, Constitutionality of the Recent Bankruptcy Law (1933) 17 MARQ. L.
REV. 163.
8. In re Murel Holding Co., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; In re Preble Corp.,
12 F. Supp. ioo2 (D. Me. 1935).
9. The court in the instant case declared that the right to file the petition might have
been denied, and that the lower court had erred in holding that good faith was merely a
question of honest intention, because good faith should be determined by the feasibility of the
plan and the reasonableness of the expectation of a successful rehabilitation. However, the
court, for other reasons, felt obliged to rule on the constitutional question.
1O. §77B (a). 48 STAT. 912 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §207 (a) (1935).
II. Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); In re Texas Gas
Utilities Co., C. C. H. Bankruptcy Service § 3014 (S. D. Tex. 1934) ; it re Hotel Park Cen-
tral Inc., C. C. H. Bankruptcy Service § 3545 (S. D. N. Y. 1935)
12. In re 235 W. 46th Street Co., 74 F. (2d) 7oo (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
13. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S.
648 (1935) ; see Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 583 (1935).
14. See In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941, 942 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
I5. See Swaine, Corporate Reorganization under Federal Bankruptcy Power (1933) 19
VA. L. REv. 317; Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923.
The almost insurmountable difficulties encoutitered by railroad reorganizers in obtaining
the consent of two-thirds of all classes has been effectively brought out in Congressional
hearings. See Hearings before the Committee on Judiciary, House of Representatives, on
H. R. 6249, Ser. 3, 74 th Cong., ist Sess. (1935).
16. Compositions, however, have affected rights of dissenting creditors, and this fact
has been advanced in support of the provisions of section 77B, since the constitutionality of
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unusual manner, it is not improbable that the Supreme Court will hold this to
be so arbitrary an exercise of the bankruptcy power as to be lacking in due
process."'
Bankruptcy-Section 77B-Foreclosure Receivership for Collection of
Rents and Profits as Prior Equity Receivership-A corporation owned and
mortgaged a large hotel. The mortgagee instituted foreclosure proceedings and
procured appointment of a receiver for the rents and profits. Creditors of the
corporation subsequently filed a petition under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy
Act,' alleging the corporation's inability to pay its debts as they matured. These
creditors relied on the above receivership to bring them within the terms of
Section 77B (a), which provides, in effect, that if a "prior proceeding in . .
equity receivership" is pending against the debtor, petitioners are relieved of the
necessity of proving an act of bankruptcy within the preceding four months.
2
Held, petition dismissed, since this receivership was not such a "prior equity
receivership" as was contemplated by the Section. Duparquet Huot & Moneufse
Co. v. Evans, 56 Sup. Ct. 412 (1936); Tuttle v. Harris, 56 Sup. Ct. 416 (1936).
The instant decisions clearly settle a phase of bankruptcy law which had
been the subject of conflicting adjudications in the lower federal courts,8 by
sections 12 and 74 of the Bankruptcy Act [30 STAT. 549 (I898), 36 STAT. 839 (I910), 1
U. S. C. A. §3o (1927) ; 47 STAT. 1467 (1933), amended by 48STAT. 922 (934),49 STAT.246,
i1 U. C. C. A. § 202 (1935)]1 providing for compositions, has been upheld. Compositions
have been rationalized as voluntary contracts between the debtor and his creditors, the will
of the majority of the creditors binding the dissenters. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v.
De Witt & Co., 237 U. S. 447 (1915); Myers v. International Trust Co., 273 U. S. 380
(1927). This theory is inapplicable, however, when an attempt is made to bind dissenting
majorities. Compositions, moreover, do not afford an entirely valid analogy, because sec-
tion 12 deals only with unsecured claims and section 74, dealing with secured claims, only
allows a delay in the remedy, and prohibits any impairment of a lien. Statutes providing
for appraisal of dissenting shareholders' interests in corporations when it is proposed to
merge, sell the entire business, etc., require agreement by a certain majority of all the share-
holders, but are silent as to the necessity for approval by a majority of each class, and courts
have seldom dealt with the problem. See Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders uider
Appraisal Statutes (193) 45 HARV. L. REV. 233. The only case found held that approval
by the statutory majority did not mean a majority of each class. Haggard v. Lexington
Utilities Co., 26o Ky. 261, 84 S. W. (2d) 84 (1935). There was no evidence, however, that
the interests of the classes were materially adverse.
17. See the rights enumerated in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295
U. S. 555, 594-595 (1935). The secured creditor has always had the right to foreclose and
have a sale of the property at which he could protect his interest by bidding and thus obtain-
ing either what he considered to be the value of his interest, or the property itself. The
great value of the property involved in equity receiverships has made this right of little
practical worth there, because it has been recognized that dissenters could not hope to com-
pete in the bidding and must depend on the court's protection of their interests by setting
a fair upset price. The argument that there will be no substantial difference in appraisals
overlooks the fact that the right to foreclose and bid may be of great importance under
section 77B, which extends to small corporations the advantages of reorganization, and in
this field the value of the property is not so high as to prevent dissenters from being able,
practically, to bid.
18. It has sometimes been argued that the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation on the
bankruptcy power. See Gerdes, Constitutionality of 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1934)
12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 196, 207. If this view ever had any foundation, it has been unequivo-
cally repudiated by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Louisville Joint Stock Latid
Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
I. 48 STAT. 911 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §207 (Supp. 1935).
2. For a comment on the difficulty of proving an act of bankruptcy, see Fried, The
Effect of Section 77B on Real Estate Reorganizations (1935) 4 BROOKLYN L. REv. 318. 325.
3. In re 2168 Broadway Corp., 78 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), aff'd by the instant
case, Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 56 Sup. Ct. 412 (1936) ; It re Allen, 78
F. (2d) 68o (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; In re Draco Realty Corp., II F. Supp. 405 (S. D. N. Y.
1935). Contra: In re Granada Hotel Corp., 78 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), rev'd by
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determining that Section 77B refers to a general equity receivership only-the
so-called "conservation suit" on a creditors' bill 4-- rather than to a particular
receivership incident to a mortgage foreclosure. Adopting the interpretation
here embraced seems the more desirable course, for the fact that companies
indebted exclusively on a mortgage are hereby denied the benefits of bankruptcy
administration is overbalanced by the consideration that such administration is
rarely more efficient or more necessary 'for purposes of such a company than
that of the state court's receiver. This is due to the fact that foreclosure pro-
ceedings commonly concern real estate corporations with holdings limited to one
building or to a few, which are almost always in one state,5 so that ancillary
administration and similar difficulties are not matters of concern. Furthermore,
as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Duparquet case,6 the historical
background of the Section demonstrates that the result actually attained is prob-
ably the most representative of the meaning which Congress intended to attach
to the term "equity receivership." Additional support for this conclusion is
marshalled by the justice's examination of subdivision (i),7 which involves the
bankruptcy court's power to take control of property included under a receiver-
ship (the "supersession of jurisdiction" doctrine)," and which, likewise, was
said by the Court to be inapplicable to receivers in foreclosure; hence pre-
existing precedents were said not to be invalidated by the subsection. Subdivi-
sion (i), however, was not justiciable in the present action, and omitting dis-
cussion of it would not have affected the outcome. While, therefore, the Court
is not irrevocably bound by its decision, nevertheless the implications of a
dictum so strong are not to be ignored. Of course it is broadly true, as was
noted in the opinion in the Duparquet case,9 that though an equity receiver must
yield to an ordinary trustee in bankruptcy,10 even such a trustee may not over-
ride valid "liens." 11 But Section 77B contains various provisions for impairing
those liens, 12 and it would not seem inevitable that the Section effects no change
in the law. Subsidiary matters, moreover, suggest themselves. For example,
does a consent receivership create such a "lien" that under some circumstances
it may not be superseded by a bankruptcy court?13 And is it material in this
the instant case, Tuttle v. Harris, 56 Sup. Ct. 416 (1936) ; In re Prairie Ave. Bldg. Corp.,
ii F. Supp. 125 (E. D. Ill. 1935).
4. See In re 2168 Broadway Corp., 78 F. (2d) 678, 679 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cited supra
note 3.
5. See, e. g., cases cited supra note 3.
6. 56 Sup. Ct. 412, 413, 414 (1936).
7. 48 STAT. 911, 920 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §2o7 (i) (Supp. 1935). The relevant
wording is as follows: "If a receiver or trustee of all or any part of the property of a cor-
poration has been appointed . . a petition . . . may be filed under this section at any
time thereafter by the corporation, or its creditors . . . and if such petition . . . is ap-
proved, the trustee or trustees appointed under this section . . . shall be entitled forthwith
to possession of and vested with title to such property ..
8. See GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 225, 226.
9. 56 Sup. Ct. 412, 415 (1936).
io. Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S. 342 (1933); cf. It re Manbeach Realty Corp.,
io F. Supp. 523 (E. D. N. Y. 1935).
ii. Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165 (9o2) (judgment); Straton v. New, 283 U. S.
318 (1931) (judgment) ; Russell v. Edmondson, 5o F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (mort-
gage).
12. See opinion in Duparquet case, 56 Sup. Ct. 412, 415 (1936), remarking that under
subsections (b), (c), (IO), (e), (f), and (h), "the suit for the foreclosure of the mort-
gage may be stayed or enjoined upon a showing of necessity . . .; the lien may be trans-
ferred to the proceeds of a sale . . .; at times the holder of the lien may have his security
modified or reduced by the plan of reorganization when finally approved . .. ."
13. Cf. Clements v. Conyers, 32 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929), cert. denied 280 U. S.
584 (I29) ; GLENN, LIQUIDATION (935) § 242; Jagow, The Fourth Act of Bankruptcy
(1935) 1O Wis. L. Ray. 479, 487.
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connection that a period of four months has elapsed? 14 The Court has not yet
passed upon these questions and others germane to them, but the dictum in the
Duparquet case may be an important indication of the direction to be taken when
they really do arise.
Constitutional Law-Arbitrary Valuation for Tax Purposes by State
Board of Equalization as a Violation of Due Process-Complainant railway,
alleging that its property had been overvalued by the State Board of .Equaliza-
tion, sought an injunction in a federal court against collection of 1933 property
taxes. The Board had fixed the tax value for 1932 by averaging (i) the stock
and bond prices of the railroad and (2) the capitalized net income earned at a
fair rate of return, each average being computed from the figures for the five
years prior to the 1932 assessment, and then averaging the two composite
figures.' The assessment for 1933 was the same as that for 1932, which, in
turn, was only slightly below the 1929 assessment.2 There was no recognized
formula for finding system value which would have approximated the figure
reached by the Board as the 1933 assessment." The railway company did not
allege that the valuation discriminated against it in favor of other property
owners, and, apparently, the Board merely was continuing the old assessments
throughout the state. Held (Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting),
that only that part of the tax which was based upon not more than 87 per cent.
of the assessment could be properly collected, since the valuation was "arbitrary"
and "excessive" in overlooking the enormous decline in the value of securities
and railroad earnings caused by the economic depression,, and hence deprived
the petitioner of property without due process of law. Great Northern Railwuay
v. Weeks, 56 Sup. Ct. 426 (1936).
For the first time in its history, the Supreme Court has held that what the
Court will call an excessive valuation for tax purposes by a state taxing body is
a violation of due process. This decision, unfortunately, appears to furnish the
basis for a flood of litigation by any taxpayers who may be dissatisfied with the
exercise of discretion by administrative officials. The case can have no other
significance, for, as the railway property was not assessed differently from that
14. Cf. Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318 (i93i) ; Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S. 342
(1933) ; GLENN, LiQUIDATION (I935) § 228.
i. The railroad contended also that the method of assigning a proportion of system
value to the state resulted in the taxation of property outside the state and therefore inter-
fered with interstate commerce, but the Court rejected this contention. The Supreme Court
has enjoined collection of a tax computed on a basis which reaches out of state property.
Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 49o (19o4); cf. Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 293 U. S. 102
(1934).
2. The assessment for the state for 1932 was $78,850,024. The 1933 assessment was
$78,832,888. The latter assessment was only about five per cent. less than the 1929 valua-
tion. The trial court found that the latter sum "was the same as the 1932 assessment except
for a deduction of $17,136 for certain trackage of the plaintiff which had been removed."
A state statute provided that all property within the state must be assessed at its true and
full value in money. N. D. Comp. Laws (913) § 2122, as amended by N. D. Comp. Laws
1925, c. 2o6, § 2.
3. This was testified to by a railroad tax expert formerly employed by the Board.
4. It is of some interest to compare the attitude expressed toward valuation as affected
by the depression in the principal case with that in the most recent case on rate-fixing in
the Supreme Court, West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662, 672 (1935).
There a public service commission attempted to fix a valuation for "fair return" on a basis
adjusted according to the index prices of commodities, wages, etc. The Supreme Court
rejected this method of valuation as unsatisfactory, saying, inter alia, "A more fundamental
defect in the commission's method is that the result is affected by sudden shifts in the price
level." West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662, 672 (1935). See Note
(1935) 49 HAuv. L. Rav. 297.
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of other taxpayers, there was no question of discrimination, and thus no viola-
tion of the constitutional guarantee of the "equal protection of the laws". 5
Likewise, the Court found that the method used by the Board did not result in
a tax upon property without the state, so that there was no attempt by the state
to tax property outside its taxing jurisdiction. 6 In the absence of either of
these contingencies, one would have expected the Court to restrict the scope of
its review of the action of a state administrative board, in order to refrain from
becoming a sort of superior Board of Equalization. And indeed, former deci-
sions of the Court have held the function of tax-assessing bodies to be "quasi-
judicial"; 7 the Court has refused, in the past, to substitute its findings for those
of the taxing body except when there was a clear abuse of discretion., "Mere
errors of judgment are not subject to review." 9 The basis for this judicial
policy has been the realization that the life blood of the state government is the
power to lay and collect taxes, without which the state could not continue its
ordinary functions.' 0 This hesitancy to interfere with administrative discretion
is especially desirable in the case of a court review of so nebulous a concept as
value. Assessors of value, and particularly of the value of a railroad system,
are chasing a will-o'-the-wisp, for there cannot be one accurate measure of
value. Market value is a useless fiction when there is no market. Value for the
purpose of fixing a base for "fair return" is and should be different from value
for taxation purposes, and both may be distinguished from value for the pur-
pose of condemnation in eminest domain proceedings.". Any other contention
assumes that value is a definite, constant, and easily observed phenomenon, and
not an elaborate conjecture based on many facts, one of which facts must be the
purpose for which value is being determined. It seems clear that in no case
should the Court allow the due process clause to shield the taxpayer when he
cannot show either that he is bearing a proportionately larger share of the tax
than are other taxpayers or that the action of the taxing authorities was com-
pletely capricious. This Court merely was differing with the administrative
body on the issue of the reasonableness of the valuation. Furthermore, as
Justice Stone pointed out, a property tax varies with the rate fixed and the
assessment made.'2 Thus, the action of the State Board of Equalization re-
sulted merely in a general increase in the tax. And, as the Board is an agency
of the legislature, the Court has, in effect, denied the power of the legislature to
fix whatever tax it pleases.
5. Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907) ; Cumberland Coal Co.
v. Board of Revision, 284 U. S. 23 (1931) ; Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennet, 284 U. S.
239 (1931).
6. Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490 (19o4) ; cf. Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 293 U. S.
102 (1934). Such a tax is often held invalid on the ground that it is an interference with
interstate commerce, which would appear to be incorrect. See supra, note 1.
7. See Hagar v. Reclamation District, iii U. S. 701, 710 (1884) ; Londoner v. City &
County of Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 386 (19o8) ; Turner v. Wade, 254 U. S. 64, 68 (192o).
8. See Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 293 U. S. 1O2, III, 112 (934); Chicago, G.
W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 98 (1924).
q. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 353 (1918) ; South-
ern Ry. v. Watts, 26o U. S. 519, 527 (1923).
io. "It takes revenue to maintain the state government . . . and where it appears to
this court that all the provisions of the law relative to making the levy have been substan-
tially complied with, we will hold the levy valid." Bonaparte v. Nelson, 142 Okla. 54, 59,
285 Pac. 10o, 1O4 (1929). See Ravage, Valuation of Public Utilities for Ad Valorem, Tax-
atiOn, (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 487, 512.
Ii. See Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Eveland, 13 F. (2d) 442 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926), cert.
granted, 273 U. S. 68o (926), writ dismissed 273 U. S. 775 (I927), where the court repudi-
ated the idea that there was identity of value for rate making and taxation purposes. See
also, Bonbright, The Problem of Judicial Valuation, (1927) 27 Col L. REv. 493 and
Ravage, cited supra note 9.
12. Instant case at 436.
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Constitutional Law-Minimum Price Legislation-Validity of Statute
Fixing Higher Minimum Sale Price for Well-Advertised Brands of Milk
than for Those Unadvertised-New York Milk Control Act provided that the
minimum sale price of well-advertised brands of milk should be one cent per
quart higher than that of unadvertised brands,' which was approximately the
differential dealers in unadvertised brands had found it necessary to maintain
prior to the passage of the act.2  Plaintiff, one of four distributors whose milk
had been designated by the MVilk Control Board as well-advertised, sought to
enjoin enforcement of the act on the ground that it violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held (McReynolds, Van Devanter,
Sutherland, Butler, JJ., dissenting), for defendant, because the legislature, in
adapting the law to existing trade practices, had not acted unreasonably. Borden's
Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 56 Sup. Ct. 453 (1936).
Provision making the lower price applicable only to dealers in unadvertised
brands who had been in business at the time the act became effective,
3 held
(Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone, JJ., dissenting), a denial of equal protection. May-
flower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 56 Sup. Ct. 457 (1936).
Having decided in the Nebbia case 4 that the milk industry in New York
was a proper subject for legislative price-fixing, the Court, in the Borden case,
recognized that the equal protection clause does not require a single price
standard for competing dealers, but is satisfied if the law preserves the existing
price scale determined by economic forces prior to the restrictive legislation.
And indeed, the differential, instead of destroying competition, the criticism
advanced in the dissenting opinion,5 actually preserved it, since at a single price
the independents would have been unable to compete at all, and the purpose of
the act, the promotion of the public health and prosperity through the stabiliza-
tion of the milk industry, might have been defeated. Limiting the differential
to existing dealers likewise could have been regarded as a reasonable means of
effecting this purpose, and the Court has upheld analogous distinctions in other
legislation. 6 However, the opinion endeavored to distinguish between the statute
involved in the Mayflower Farms case and the other legislation on the ground
that the latter, although imposing different restrictions on persons entering occu-
pations at different times, was clearly related to the public health or welfare,
whereas the record disclosed no basis for the distinction here, and the Court,
singularly unimaginative, would not "conjure up possible situations which might
justify the discrimination." 7 The dissenting justices, on the other hand, less
certain of judicial infallibility, pointed out that the preferable policy, declared
by the Court in earlier decisions, was not to set aside a statutory classification
i. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 126, § 258 (q).
2. The case had come before the Court once before, on the pleadings, and had been
remanded for complainant to prove that no such differential had existed prior to the statute.
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194 (1934). The district court then
found as a fact that the advertising had created in the public mind the idea that the adver-
tised milk was better, with the result that the independent companies could not sell their
milk, although of equal grade, at the same price. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck,
ii F. Supp. 599 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
3. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 126, § 258(q).
4. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 5o2 (I934), Note (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 619.
As the sale in the Nebbia case occurred in Rochester, the problem of the differential was not
involved.
5. 56 Sup. Ct. 453, 457.
6. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173 (191o) (medical registration law applying only
to those beginning practice after a certain date) ; Stanley v. Utilities Commission of Maine,
295 U. S. 76 (935) (statute giving existing highway carriers licenses as of right, but re-
quiring later entrants to prove public necessity).
7. 56 Sup. Ct. 457, 459.
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as a denial of equal protection of the laws "if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it." 8
Constitutional Law-Validity of Tennessee Valley Authority Act-The
Tennessee Valley Authority, an agency of the federal government,' contracted
with the Alabama Power Company for the sale of surplus power by the former
to the latter, for the sale of transmission lines and substations by the Company
to the Authority, for an interchange of hydroelectric energy, and for an alloca-
tion of the areas to be served with power by each. The transmission lines ran
from the Wilson Dam, which was capable of generating enough power to enable
the Authority to meet its contractual requirements. Petitioners, preferred
shareholders of the Power Company, after an unsuccessful demand upon the
Company's directors to cancel the contract, sought to enjoin its performance,
joining the Authority and the Company as defendants. Held (McReynolds, J.
dissenting), that the injunction should be denied. Four justices (Hughes, C. J.,
Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler, JJ.) based their opinion on the ground
that the action of the Authority was constitutional; four justices (Brandeis,
Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo, JJ.) concurred on the ground that the petitioners
had no standing before the Court. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936).
The constitutionality of sales by the federal government of electric power
incidentally generated by projects maintained primarily for war purposes 2 or
for the improvement of navigable waters 3 is well supported.4  Chief Justice
Hughes, avoiding the issue of the validity of the entire Tennessee Valley pro-
gram by confining his opinion solely to the question of the Wilson Dam, which
had been originally constructed as a military measure, 5 decided that the con-
struction of the dam was a reasonable exercise of the war powers of Congress
and a legitimate aid to navigability. Then, discarding the contention that the
only power saleable was the negligible surplus which would have to be produced
as a margin of safety to insure an adequate supply of electricity for the manu-
facture of munitions and the operation of the locks, four justices held that all
the energy produced by the fall of water was incidentally acquired national
property capable, under the Constitution, of conversion into electric power and
subsequent alienation. In view of the unlimited terms of the expressly con-
ferred Congressional disposal power 8 an insistence upon the surplus require-
ment would have been unwarranted. Indeed, the power is so broadly stated
8. 56 Sup. Ct. 457, 461, quoting from Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294
U. S. 58o, 584 (1935).
I. Established by 48 STAT. 58 (933), 16 U. S. C. A. §831 (Supp. 1935).
2. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, ci. II-I6.
3. The power of Congress over navigation has been deduced from the commerce clause,
U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the leading case being, of course, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
I (U. S. 1824). See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (U. S. 1866). See also, 2 WIL-
LOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) 571.
4. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 73 (1913);
cf. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U. S. 58 (1898); Alabama Power
Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 6o6 (M. D. Ala. 1922) ; Waters v. Phillips, 284 Fed. 237 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1922); Alabama v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 897 (Ct. Cl. 1930) ; Missouri v. Union
Electric Light & Power Co., 42 F. (2d) 692 (C. C. Mo. 193o), appeals dismissed, 53 F. (2d)
Io8o, 1084 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931). See, for a more complete discussion, Welch, Costitution-
ality of the Tennessee Valley Authority (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 388; Clothier, The Federal
Water Power Program (1935) 84 U. oF PA. L. REv. I; Notes (1935) 48 HIuiv. L. RE V. 8o6;
83 U. OF PA. L. R-v. 662; (1936) 9 S. CA. L. REv. 137.
S. See instant case at 473.
6. U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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that the validity of restricting its application only to such property as is inci-
dentally acquired through the exercise of other powers might be questionable.
The Court has not gone this far, however, but has implied, rather, that although
Congress may deal freely with federal property, the government may not acquire
property for the very purpose of sale nor engage in a general manufacturing
and merchandising business disassociated from the exercise of other govern-
mental powers.7 While applying this limitation, the decision still permitted a
relatively insignificant connection with navigation and munitions manufacture
to support an extensive selling activity. But in this respect it did not go far
beyond Arizona v. California,8 which approved the constitutionality of the
Boulder Dam development. The dissenting justice realistically pointed out that
the Authority was designed to be and actually was primarily an agency for the re-
habilitation of a large area and a "yardstick" for private electric rates, a position
for which he found ample support in the Authority's own reports." Neverthe-
less, the inclination of the Chief Justice to narrow the Court's review appears
to be more desirable in a situation where the government is dealing with its own
property and is not regulating directly the use of private property.
But if the scope of judicial review was restricted, its availability was ex-
tended, for, with no showing of bad faith on the part of the directors or even of
injury to the shareholders, the latter were permitted to maintain a suit solely
because the other contracting party was alleged to have acted unconstitutionally.
The cases cited by the Court as upholding the power of shareholders to enjoin
the corporate management from complying with the exactions of legislation
claimed to have been invalid,1 were hardly apposite, since they involved
coercion upon the corporation, and the directors did not act voluntarily and for
a wholly satisfactory consideration. In Smith v. Kansas City,"' most heavily
stressed, the Court had assumed jurisdiction over a shareholder's bill to enjoin
directors from investing in the bonds of an allegedly unconstitutional federal
agency. But in that case, unsatisfactory at best, it was assumed that the cor-
poration could make "legal investments" only, so that the constitutional ques-
tion was only incidental to the problem of ultra vires acts by the corporation. 2
The instant Court may have been motivated by a desire to afford a review for
7. Such an interpretation is, of course, broader, than the usual verbalism limiting the
exercise of disposal power only to property acquired incidentally in the exercise of other
granted powers, since conceivably property might be acquired outside those powers and yet
not .for the purpose of resale. That this is the more accurate way of putting the proposition
may appear from the following hypothetical situation. Suppose the federal government acquired
land for a purpose later discovered not to be within its delegated powers, as say, for growing
wheat. Can it be supposed that the land could not rightfully be sold or leased? An affirma-
tive answer is as unwarranted as a statement that money obtained by an unconstitutional tax,
paid without protest, cannot be expended. The sale of the wheat to be grown on the land
might be forbidden, however, just as the sale of power released by the fall of water over a
dam. So too, no one could reasonably contend that if the sale of power by TVA had beenheld
unconstitutional, the government would have been unable to sell Wilson dam.
8. 283 U. S. 423 (I93i), which affirmed the validity of water-power projects provided
they were "not unrelated to the control of navigation". Id. at 455, 456.' The case found that
the dam and hydroelectric plant erected in Boulder Canyon were valid means of controlling
navigation, although the practical effects on navigation were slight, while there was an ex-
tensive development and sale of electric power. See Note (1935) 48 HthAv. L. Rtv. 8o6, 812.
9. Cited in the instant case at 489n.
1o. As in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R., 24o U. S. 1 (I916), where the right of share-
holders to seek to restrain voluntary payment of an allegedly invalid tax was sustained. The
authorities in which the constitutionality of a statute was tested by shareholders' suits are fully
reviewed in Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion. Instant case at 484-486.
I. 255 U. S. I8o (I92I).
12. See id. at i99, and Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting at 214.
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legislation not readily reviewed otherwise,13 or by the feeling that the threatened
competition by the Authority was an economic coercion effective enough to
approximate "duress" upon the corporate directors, and thus warranted hearing
the complaint of the shareholders.
Equity-Personal Rights-Taxpayer's Power to Enjoin Governmental
Investigation of Books in His Broker's Possession Relative to Past Income
Taxes Collection of Which Had Been Barred by the Statute of Limitations
-Complainant filed income tax returns for 1929 and 1930, which were ap-
proved, with corrections, by the Department of Internal Revenue within the
period prescribed by statute.' Three years after the expiration of such period
the Department sought to investigate the records of complainant's broker and
banker, regarding complainant's transactions during 1929 and 1930, which in-
vestigation complainant sought to enjoin.' Held, that an injunction should issue
in order to protect complainant's right to be secure in his private affairs. Zin-
merman v. Wilson, C. C. A. 3rd, Feb. II, 1936.
The first portion of the court's opinion is apparently based on the constitu-
tional right of one to be secure in one's ". . . papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches . . . ".' However, it is generally recognized that the fourth
amendment to the Constitution applies only to criminal prosecutions,4 with which
complainant in the instant case was not threatened. 5 While, therefore, con-
tinued governmental investigation might become irksome, it would not be un-
constitutional.6 It is apparent, therefore, that the basis for the decision is to be
found not in the Fourth Amendment, but in the acceptance of the principles
that a person has a property right in the information contained in his broker's
books, so far as it relates to the taxpayer's transactions, and that the courts should
prevent a "violation of the natural law of privacy in one's own affairs which
exists in liberty loving peoples and nations." 7 But, while there is authority
13. A similar attitude has recently been shown towards the spending power. See United
States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 547, restricting the doctrine of
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (923).
I. 45 STAT. 856, 857 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. §275, 276 (1934).
2. While there was a conflict in the record as to whether the broker's books had been
inspected by the Department of Internal Revenue during its first audit of complainant's re-
turn for 1929 and i93o, the court, in its opinion, assumes that there had been such an exam-
ination.
3. U. S. CoNsr. Amend. 4. In the words of the court, at p. 4,". • • a search for which
no reason can be shown is an unreasonable search", the theory being that since no further
assessment could be levied, there was no reason or purpose in such a re-examination.
4. In re Strouse, Fed. Cas. No. 13,548 (D. Nev. 1871) ; U. S. v. Distillery No. Twenty-
eight, Fed. Cas. No. 14,966 (D. Ind. 1875) ; United States v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile, 295
Fed. r42 (D. Ala. 1924), aff'd, 267 U. S. 576 (925).
5. So far as appears from the government brief in the case, as well as from the opinion
of the court, there was no allegation of a fraudulent return having been made by com-
plainant which would subject him to criminal prosecution.
6. Bolich v. Rubel, 67 F. (2d) 894 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
7. Typewritten opinion, at 6. It is the attempt to enjoin the search of books in the
hands of a third party, under the conditions described, which makes this case one of first
impression. There have been apparently, only two cases in which injunctions have been
sought to prevent the government from obtaining information in the hands of a third party,
and in both the injunctions were denied. Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F. (2d) 93o (D. Mass. 1928)
(the statute of limitations had not yet barred any further tax assessments) ; Caplis v. Hel-
vering, 4 F. Supp. 181 (E. D. N. Y. 1933) (the third party sought the injunction, which
was denied on the ground that there was an adequate remedy at law).
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which recognizes the fiduciary nature of a broker's employment,8 as well as the
obligation of a bank to make no improper disclosure of the depositor's affairs to
unauthorized persons,' still that would hardly justify the request for an injunc-
tion, based on a property right in the information contained in the broker's books,
and this property right generally has not been extended as far as it was in the
present case.10 It would seem, therefore, that the decision can be supported only
upon the individual's "right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary or
unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in respect of (his) personal and private
affairs." "- While there has been, in recent years, a desirable and ever growing
tendency to protect by injunction the right to privacy, this protection has largely
been accorded in cases of violations of this right by individuals; and there has
been, during the same period, an equal extension of governmental activity, so
that it is more doubtful whether the same protection should be afforded against
an alleged governmental invasion of the interest in privacy.
Evidence-Admissibility of Record of Criminal Conviction in Civil
Action as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule-Plaintiff, the administrator of
an intestate insured against accidental death by defendant insurance company,
sought recovery of the insurance proceeds in substitution for the named bene-
ficiary, who was alleged to have become disentitled because she had feloniously
taken the life of the insured.' To prove the fact of the felonious killing, and
that in consequence the insured's estate became entitled to the proceeds, plaintiff
offered in evidence the criminal conviction of the beneficiary for manslaughter.
Held, the evidence was inadmissible, because a criminal conviction could not be
given in evidence in a civil action to prove the facts upon which it had been
rendered. Goodwin v. Continental Casualty Co., 53 P. (2d) 241 (Okla. 1935).
This decision represents the weight of authority that the record of a criminal
conviction is inadmissible in a subsequent civil action as proof of facts in issue
in both trials, on the ground that it is merely hearsay evidence of the facts
found.2 However, the more modern tendency is to favor the admission of a
conviction as prima facie evidence of the facts on which it is based, despite its
character as hearsay, as there is a sufficient guarantee of truth.3 Perhaps the
8. American Cotton Mills v. Monier, 61 F. (2d) 852 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932); Lipkien v.
Krinski, 192 App. Div. 257, 182 N. Y. Supp. 454 (Ist Dep't. i92o) ; Vollmer v. Newburger,
277 Pa. 282, 121 Atl. 56 (1923).
9. Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] I K. B. 461;
PAGEr, BANKING (3d ed. 1922) 77.
io. This type of property right has generally been extended only to cover information
contained in private letters. See Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (89o) 4
HARv. L. REv. 193, 211. And so far as appears, in only one case at all comparable to the
principal one, Brex v. Smith, lO4 N. J. Eq. 386, 146 At]. 34 (Ch. x929) has the court en-
joined a public official from investigating bank records on the ground of complainant's prop-
erty interest in the information contained therein. Contra: Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F. (2d)
930 (D. Mass. 1928).
ii. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 292 (1929). See also In re Pacific Ry.
Commission, 32 Fed. 241, 250 (1887).
I. Death of insured as a result of the felonious act of the beneficiary defeats the bene-
ficiary's right to the proceeds of the policy. New York Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong,
117 U. S. 591 (1886) ; VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. I93O) § I56.
2. United States v. Guay, II F. Supp. 8o6 (D. N. H. 1935) ; Page v. Phelps, io8 Conn.
572, 143 Atl. 89o (1928) ; Girard v. Vermont Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 Atl. 666 (1931);
2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 653.
3. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 4o0, 150 So. 491 (933); Douglas v.
Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 48 Ga. App. 427, 172 S. E. 828 (934) ; Tucker v. Tucker, ioi
N. 3. Eq. 72, 137 Atl. 404 (I927), Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711
(1932) ; In the Estate of Crippen [1911] Prob. I8. A few cases have held the conviction
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most fundamental guarantee of the truth of evidence is the right of cross-exam-
ination by the party against whom it is offered.4 When the party in the civil
action against whom a conviction is introduced was also the accused in the
criminal action, it is manifest that an adequate opportunity and incentive to
cross-examine witnesses were had, and that the truth to be ascertained thereby
was sufficiently guaranteed. But where, as in the instant case, the party in the
civil action was not the accused, the introduction of the conviction would be in
deprivation of his right to cross-examine, and therefore it would seem that the
evidence ought to be inadmissible.' However, this usually valid objection to
hearsay evidence is outweighed by the great probative value of the criminal
conviction, arising out of the necessity for proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.8 Furthermore, there are other reasons for admissibility, peculiar to, but
especially pertinent in the instant case. In the first place, the defendant insur-
ance company could have introduced the conviction, under the modern rule of
admissibility, against the convicted beneficiary if the latter had sued for the
proceeds. In addition, the defendant impliedly admits its liability to pay the
proceeds to someone, but pleads its liability to the criminal beneficiary rather
than to the present plaintiff. Thus, since the defendant bases its defense upon
the rights of the beneficiary, the same evidence should be admissible against the
defendant as would have been admissible against that beneficiary.
Master and Servant-Liability of Master for Negligence of Servant
When Latter Has Injured His Own Wife-Plaintiff, while riding in an auto-
mobile belonging to her husband's employer, which her husband was driving on
business within the scope of his employment, was injured in a collision caused
by her husband's negligence. Suit was brought against the employer, who joined
the husband as defendant by a writ of scire facias. Separate judgments were
given for plaintiff against the employer, and for the employer against plaintiff's
husband. On appeal from the first judgment, held, for plaintiff, on the ground
that the master is liable for the wrongful acts of his servant, notwithstanding
the latter's personal immunity from suit by the plaintiff,' which is defeated by
to be conclusive evidence of the facts involved. Supulver v. Gilchrist & Dawson, 28 N. M.
339, 211 Pac. 595 (19"); Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va.
82, 140 S. E. 314 (1927). The possibility qf an absurd result where the prior conviction
is totally excluded is shown in Lillie v. Modem Woodmen of America, 89 Neb. 1, 13o N. W.
1oo4 (1911), where a beneficiary of a life policy was allowed to recover the insurance pro-
ceeds after having been convicted of the insured's murder, although a clause of the policy
provided that the policy would be void if the death of the insured were caused by the bene-
ficiary.
4. See Maybee v. Avery, 18 Johns. 351, 354 (N. Y. 1818). Evidence of a conviction
should not be excluded merely because of the lack of "mutuality" due to the inadmissibility
of an acquittal. See 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 656; Note (1932) 17 COR.t.
L. Q. 493; (I92) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. II64- Nor should it be held inadmissible because
of the fact that the degree of proof in the subsequent civil action differs from that neces-
sary in the prior criminal action, for a lesser degree is required in the civil action. See
Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N. Y. 310, 313, 179 N. E. 711, 712 (1932). For a full dis-
cussion of the reasons against admissibility of criminal conviction in a civil action, see In-
terstate Dry Goods Store v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301 (1922); Note (924)
31 A. L. R. 201, 264.
5. Summers v. Rutherford, 195 S. W. 5II (Mo. App. 1917); 3 WiGmoRe, EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 1923) § 1388.
6. See Chafee, The Progress of the Law-Evidence (I9"2) 35 HA v. L. REv. 428, 44o,
for a suggestion that an exception to the hearsay rule for "solemn adjudications" in gen-
eral would be desirable.
i. A Pennsylvania statute provides that a wife may not sue her husband except in a
proceeding for divorce or to protect and recover her separate property. PA. STAr. ANN.
(Purdon, 193o) tit. 48, § Ill.
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the servant's subsequent liability to the master.2  Koonts v. Messer, 181 Atl.
792 (Pa. 1935).
In holding the employer liable, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed
the trend of authority,8 which rests upon the theory that the basis of vicarious
liability is not the servant's liability, but his wrongdoing. As was indicated in
a previous issue of the REVIEW, 4 since vicarious liability is justified on the
ground that it permits including in the cost of the enterprise the risks normally
incident thereto, the fact that the person injured happens to be a member of the
wrongdoer's family should be immaterial.
Mortgages-Power to Proceed Against Personalty Prior to Realty
Under the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act of 1935-Plaintiff mort-
gagee entered judgment on the bond of defendant mortgagor. The latter
petitioned to quash an attachment on personal property, contending that the
mortgaged premises must first be sold in order to fix the amount of the defi-
ciency judgment. Held, that the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act of
1935 ' did not require the mortgagee to proceed first against the realty, but
permitted him to enter judgment on the bond and attach personalty of the mort-
gagor at once. Integrity Trust Co. v. Wilkinson, 24 D. & C. 549 (Pa. 1935).
Several distressed mortgagors have recently, before the trial courts of
Pennsylvania, advanced the contention so effectively discarded in the instant
case.2  No express support for the position that the creditor's common law
rights against collateral have been restricted is to be found in the statute as a
whole. Taken separately, however, the last clause of Section i,' when com-
pared with the title of the Act 4 does furnish some basis for the contention of
the debtor-mortgagor. It seems clear, however, that the legislature did not
intend that creditors should be forced to resort to a useless sale as a formal
2. The court had previously held that the statute permitting a defendant to join as an
additional defendant by writ of scire facias anyone alleged to be liable over to him for the
cause of action declared on [PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 12, § 141] was not in-
tended to alter the plaintiff's rights as to the original defendant. Vinnacombe v. Philadel-
phia, 297 Pa. 564, 147 Atl. 826 (1929).
3. Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., iii Conn. 377, 15o Atl. io7 (193o);
Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42 (1928); Poulin v.
Graham, 102 Vt. 307, 147 Atl. 698 (1929) ; RESTATEmENT, AGENcY (1933) §217 (2). Contra:
Maine v. Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 2ol N. W. 2o (1924) ; Sacknoff v. Sacknoff,
131 Me. 28o, 161 Atl. 669 (1932) ; cf. Riser v. Riser, 24o Mich. 402, 215 N. W. 290 (1927).
4. (I936) 84 U. oF PA. L. REv. 429.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1935) tit. 21, § 808.
2. Shallcross v. North Branch-Sedgwick B. & L. Ass'n, 24 D. & C. 496 (Pa. 1935);
Commercial Bldg. Ass'n v. Steen, 24 D. & C. 575 (Pa. 1935). See Ridge-Allen B. & L.
Ass'n v. Leshefko, 24 D. & C. 7o3 (Pa. 1935). For a holding that the mortgagee was not
precluded from realizing on additional collateral pledged for the obligation before foreclos-
ing on the mortgage and establishing a deficiency judgment, see Evans v. Provident Trust
Co., 319 Pa. 5o, 179 At. 452 (935), which interpreted a prior act, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon
Supp. 1935) tit. 21, § 8o6.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1935) tit. 21, § 808. "In all cases where a bond and
mortgage, or any other obligation securing or guaranteeing the payment thereof, is or has
been given for the same debt, the real property, bound by such bond and mortgage, shall
first be proceeded against and sold on execution, and the amount of the deficiency judgment
ascertained, as hereinafter provided, before any other real property of the mortgage debtor
may be attached, levied on or sold for the debt secured by such bond and mortgage, and
before any property, real or personal of any such other person may be sold for the debt
secured by such bond and mortgage (italics added).
4. Pa. Laws (1935) 503. "To protect the obligors or guarantors of bonds and mort-
gages, and owners of property affected thereby, and others indirectly liable for the payment
thereof, and owners of mortgaged property affected thereby" (italics added).
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prerequisite to proceedings against a thoroughly solvent debtor.5  The variety
of possible interpretations open to the court should not distract attention from
the dearly correct result, whether it be based upon the rule of statutory con-
struction that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly con-
strued, which would leave the mortgagee's usual rights against collateral unim-
paired, or upon a praiseworthy attempt to penetrate beyond meaningless language
and ascertain the real "intent" of the legislature.
Taxation-Governmental Immunity-Power of a State to Tax Shares
of National Bank Held by Reconstruction Finance Corporation-Recon-
struction Finance Corporation owned all the preferred stock of defendant na-
tional bank, which contended the shares were immune from state and municipal
taxation.Y The statute creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation ex-
empted from taxation its franchise, its capital, its reserves and surplus. 2 An
earlier statute had withdrawn from national bank shares the immunity from
taxation usually granted to governmental instrumentalities.3 Held, that the
shares were taxable because the statute according the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation immunity from taxation was not intended to withdraw the consent
which Congress had previously given to the taxation of all national bank shares.4
Baltimore Nat. Bank v. State Tax Comm. of Maryland, 56 Sup. Ct. 417 (1936).
In view of the all-inclusive language of the statute by which Congress gave
consent to the taxation of national bank shares,5 the result reached in the instant
case would appear to be correct. The Court had already held that national bank
shares owned by other national banks were taxable, 6 and it would seem that the
immunity to which national banks are entitled by virtue of being governmental
instrumentalities 7 is no less than that which the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration could claim as a governmental instrumentality. Moreover, a well
settled rule of statutory construction-that an act whose terms are specific is to
be construed as an exception to one more general in terms- 8 supports the
Court's view that the act creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and
5. "It cannot be contended that, where the obligor on a bond is in possession of cash
funds, he is excused of his obligation of contract, and that an obligee must first apply him-
self to what may be a fruitless sale of real estate, with its incident legal expenses, before
being able to attach funds belonging to the obligor." Shallcross v. North Branch-Sedgwick
B. & L. Ass'n, 24 D. & C. 496, 498 (Pa. 1935).
i. It is settled practice for a bank or other corporation to litigate a question of tax-
ability on behalf of its stockholders. Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Fairwether, 263 U. S. 1o3
(1923).
2. 47 STAT. 5, 9 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. §§6oi, 61o (Supp. 1934).
3. 44 SrAT. 223 (1926), 12 U. S. C. A. § 548 (1926). The statute traces its origin to
13 STAT. 99, 112 (1864).
4. With respect to the question whether Congress intended in exempting the Re-
construction Finance Corporation from taxation that national bank shares held by the Cor-
poration should nevertheless be taxable, it is interesting to note that an administration-
sponsored bill extending the immunity to cover the present case passed the Senate (80 CONG.
REc. Feb. 24, 1936 at 2698), but was defeated in the House (80 CONG. REc. Feb. 25, 1936
at 2864).
5. 44 STAT. 223 (1926), x2 U. S. C. A. § 548 (1926) provides: "The legislature of each
State may determine . . . the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking
associations located within its limits."
6. Bank of Redemption v. Boston, 125 U. S. 6o (1883). The Court says, at p. 70, that
the question of ownership is not material in deciding whether the shares are taxable.
7. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 18ig). See (1935) 84 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 263; (z936) 84 U. oF PA. L. REv. 664.
8. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. oo, 125 (i9o4) ; Townsend v. Little, iog U. S.
504, 52 (1883).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
granting it immunity from taxation was not intended to preclude the operation
of the earlier act withdrawing the immunity from national bank shares. The
Court of Appeal of Maryland, from which the instant case was appealed, had
reached the same result by quite different reasoning in an opinion 9 discussed in
an earlier issue of the REVIEW. 10  The Maryland court held the shares taxable
because the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, not performing essential gov-
ernmental functions, was not entitled to immunity as a governmental instru-
mentality.
Taxation-Inheritance Taxes-Power of a State to Tax Intangible
Property Owned by One Domiciled in a Foreign Country-A domiciliary of
Canada died leaving substantial accounts in banks in the state of Washington.
Washington sought to collect an inheritance tax on these accounts under a
statute I which imposed the tax on all property within the state's jurisdiction.
Held, that the bank accounts were subject to the inheritance tax. In re Lloyd's
Estate, 52 P. (2d) 1269 (Wash. 1936).
A series of cases 2 in the last six years has made it clear that two states
cannot levy inheritance taxes on the transfer of the same property without
violating due process of law.3 Tangible property is subject to taxation only by
the state in which it is physically located,4 whereas intangible property is taxable
only in the state in which its owner is domiciled. 5 These decisions, which re-
versed prior authority,6 were obviously necessary in order to prevent the in-
creasing injustice occasioned by the previous multiple, taxation. As bank
accounts are intangibles, 7 the accounts in the instant case would have been
subject to taxation by the domicile of the deceased. This case, therefore, raises
the question whether the due process clause prohibits a state from taxing prop-
erty which is also taxable in a foreign country, instead of in a sister state." The
Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states
to respect each other's rights in regard to inheritance taxes, and so guarantees
mutuality. However, an application of the rules governing taxation by two
states to international cases would put American courts in the position of pro-
tecting foreigners against such multiple taxation while our own citizens with
foreign interests remained subject to double taxation. And, recognizing the
possibility of the danger in an analogous case, the United States Supreme Court
recently held valid under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment a
federal tax on intangibles located within this country, but owned by an English
domiciliary who had died in Cuba.9 Therefore, the present decision appears to
9. Baltimore Nat. Bank v. State Tax Comm. of Maryland, i8o Atl. 26o (Md. 1935).
1O. (1935) 84 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 263.
i. WAsn. REv. STAT. (Rem. 1933) § 11201.
2. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204 (i93o); Baldwin v. Mis-
souri, 281 U. S. 586 (193o); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. I
(1930); First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
3. See Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 582; Note
(933) 47 HARV. L. Rxv. 307, 309.
4. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (i9o5) ; Frick v. Penn-
sylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (925).
5. Note 2 supra.
6. See, e. g., Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (19o3).
7- Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (193o).
8. One case on this point has previously arisen. The decision was the same as that in
this case. It re McCreery's Estate, 220 Cal. 26, 29 P. (2d) x86 (1934), Note 23 CAL. L.
Ray. 93.
9. Burnett v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933), 42 YAi L. J. 1277, Note 47 HAV. L. REv.
307. See also, Developments in the Law of Taxation (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 12o9, 1222.
RECENT CASES
be correct, for logically, there does not appear to be any difference between the
power of the states and of the federal government to tax intangibles owned by
foreign domiciliaries. Although multiple taxation in this, as in other situations,
is undesirable, the best way to avoid the duplication of taxes is by reciprocal
agreements with foreign nations.10 The protection of foreigners from multiple
taxation under the present circumstances would destroy our bargaining power
for the negotiation of such agreements, with consequent unfairness to citizens
of the United States who own intangible property situated abroad.
Torts-Liability of Land Occupier for Acts Done off the Land Which
Result in Injury to Trespasser on the Land-Defendant, while laying a
drain pipe, but not on its land, negligently damaged a gas main encased therein.
A year later, the gas escaping from the main flowed through the drain pipe into
a vacant house owned by the same defendant, and asphyxiated plaintiff's in-
testate, a trespasser there. Held (one judge dissenting), that defendant was
liable since its immunity as a land occupier did not extend to acts or omissions
done off the land, even though they took effect on the land. Ehret v. Village of
Scarsdale, 269 N. Y. 198, 199 N. E. 56 (1935).
It is a familiar principle that land occupiers are under no duty either to
make the land reasonably safe for trespassers ' or to refrain from activities
unreasonably dangerous to them.2  The instant case introduces a limitation on
this immunity which seems never to have been applied before, but which is con-
sistent with the reasons underlying the immunity, as is apparent from an exam-
ination of its real basis. It has been said that the land occupier owes the tres-
passer no duty of exercising reasonable care because the latter is a wrongdoer.3
If that were the correct basis of the land occupier's immunity, the defendant
should have prevailed in the instant case, for plaintiff's intestate was no less a
wrongdoer because defendant had done the act off the land.4 But this is not
the basis, for although the trespasser is equally a wrongdoer when he is injured
by the land occupier's intentionally wrongful act,5 or when he is injured because
of a dangerous condition created by a trespasser, or a licensee of the land oc-
cupier,6 or when he is injured by a negligent act done off the land by one other
than the land occupier, 7 he is, nevertheless, allowed recovery. It has been said,
also, that a trespasser's presence is unforeseeable, and for that reason there is no
duty to refrain from acts which are in fact dangerous to him.8 But, it is com-
mon experience that people trespass frequently,9 and, moreover, in the instant
io. See Carroll, The Development of International Tax Law (1935) 2_9 AM. J. I1T. L.
586; SELIGMAN, DouBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL FiscAL CO-OPERATION (1928) 170.
I. Union Stock Yards & Transit Co. v. Rourke, io Ill. App. 474 (1881) ; HARPER, TORTS
(933) §9o; R.STATEmENT, TORTS (1934) §333 (a).
2. Capitula v. New York C. R. R., 213 App. Div. 526, 210 N. Y. Supp. 651 (3d Dep't,
1925); HARPER, TORTS (1933) § go; RESTATEtmENT, TORTS (1934) § 333 (b). But aliter
where the presence of the trespasser is known. Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 8o N. W.
117 (1899); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (I934) §336.
3. See Lary v. Cleveland, C. C. & I. R. R., 78 Ind. 323, 326 (1881); Sweeney v. Old
Colony & Newport R. R., 92 Mass. 368, 372 (1865).
4. See Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Bush, 2o4 Ala. 658, 66o, 86 So. 541, 544 (920).
5. Bird v. Holbrook, 6 L. J. (o. s.) C. P. 146 (1828).
6. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas and Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 139 Atl. 440 0927) ; see
Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 506, 5o8.
7. Wilson v. American Bridge Co., 74 App. Div. 596, 77 N. Y. Supp. 82o (ion).
8. Murphy v. C. R. I. & P. R. R., 38 Iowa 539, 543 (1874).
9. See Goodrich, Landowner's Duty to Strangers on His Premises-As Developed in the
Iowa Decisions (922) 7 IowA L. Bum. 65, 71, which rejects as an explanation of the land-
owner's immunity the theory that a trespasser's presence is not to be foreseen.
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case there can be little doubt that plaintiff's intestate was within the class of
persons who should have been foreseen to have been endangered by the negligent
laying of the pipe.10 Finally, and most accurately, the land occupier's immunity
has been explained by the reluctance of the courts to interfere with his freedom
to apply his land to any use he may desire. Therefore, a duty to exercise reason-
able care toward others on his land is imposed only when he has voluntarily as-
sumed such a duty, or has received some benefit from their presence."' But this
social and historical reason, which would seem to be the true basis of the land oc-
cupier's privilege to act in a way which would be negligent if he did not enjoy his
peculiar status, can have no application where, as here, the act for which lia-
bility is sought to be imposed was neither committed on the land nor related
closely to the enjoyment of it. Freedom to engage in activities on one's land
obviously is not abridged by a refusal to grant one an immunity with respect to
acts done off the land and unconnected with its possession. Although the ma-
jority opinion and the dissent both recognize this fact, the majority would impose
liability in all cases in which the act is done off the land, whereas the dissenting
judge would deny the privilege only when the act was done off the land and, in
addition, was not closely related to the possession of the land. While the latter
view would seem correct in theory, the practical difficulty of applying it, together
with the desirable tendency of the law toward limiting the land occupier's im-
munity, render the principle applied by the majority preferable.
Trusts-Successive Beneficiaries-Status of Corporate Stock Acquired
with Corpus Funds by Exercise of Rights to Subscribe Granted During Life
Estate-Corporate shares and cash were left in trust for A for life, remainder
to B. During A's life, the corporation granted pre-emptive rights which the
trustee exercised by purchasing, with funds of the corpus, new shares at less
than their book value, retaining them as part of the corpus. The book value of
the original shares had increased sufficiently to offset the amount withdrawn by
the trustee.' Held, that the new shares should be distributed to A without
reimbursing the corpus for the purchase price, as the intact value of the corpus
was preserved.2 In re Hostetter's Estate, 319 Pa. 572, 181 Atl. 567 (1935).
io. Principal case at 6o, 61. There is a dictum in Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Bush,
204 Ala. 658, 66o, 86 So. 541, 544 (1920) that a land occupier's duty to a trespasser cannot
be increased by the fact that the land occupier does the act off his land. In that case, de-
fendant, on a highway, negligently permitted his horse to run away and injure plaintiff, who
was trespassing on defendant's land. Denial of liability there could have been based on
the ground that plaintiff's danger could not have been foreseen, even if the plaintiff were
lawfully on the land. On very similar facts, it was held in Tolhausen v. Davies, 59 L. T.
436 (Q. B. 1888) that plaintiff was outside the scope of defendant's duty, whether the former
was rightfully or wrongfully on defendant's land.
Ii. See Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligatioms in the Law of Torts, (19o5) 53
Am. L. REG. 209, 239.
!. The court presumed throughout that all increase of value in the shares was due to
earnings in the period after the creation of the trust.
2. The intact value was as follows:
Original 1300 shares @ $78.6o (original value) $102,I8o
Purchased 345 shares @ $5o.oo 17,250
Intact Value $119,430
Distribution:
To B: 1304 shares @ $91.65 (present value) $II9,5I,
To A: 341 shares @ $91.65 31,253
$150,764
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Contrary to the great weight of authority," Pennsylvania courts have held
that the proceeds of the sale of stock rights granted during the life tenancy
should be apportioned, the remainderman receiving enough to preserve the intact
value of the corpus, the balance being distributed to the life tenant.
4 However,
the instant case is apparently the first to involve directly the exercise of stock
rights with funds of the corpus,5 and by its decision the court has taken another
step toward limiting the remainderman's share to the bare intact value of the
corpus. Two methods of distribution were possible in the present case under
the principle previously enunciated by the court in Nirdlinger's Estate: 6 (I)
award the remainderman as many shares at their present book value as equal
the intact value of the corpus-determined by adding the amount of cash with-
drawn to the original book value of the original shares-with the balance going
to the life tenant. This method was approved in a recent dictum 7 and adopted
in the instant case; (2) award the remainderman the original shares plus enough
additional shares at their present book value to reimburse the corpus for the
cash withdrawn, the balance then being apportioned between the life tenant and
the remainderman in order to maintain the intact value of the corpus.8 This
method seems preferable, for, as the funds withdrawn from the corpus and
applied to the purchase of additional shares represent a new investment in cap-
ital,0 the corpus should be reimbursed before any distribution occurs. The
increased value of the trust property came from two different sources, the profit
resulting from the exercise of the rights and the increased book value of the
original shares. The former is income which has been distributed to stock-
holders, and, therefore, belongs to the life tenant. But the latter represents
accumulated surplus which has not been realized, either through declaration of
a dividend or sale by the trustee, and therefore belongs to the remainderman. 10
3. Most states treat the proceeds of the sale of stock rights as belonging to the re-
mainderman. Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 196 N. E. 324 (Ind. 1935);
2 PERRY, TRusTs (7th ed. 1929) § 546; RFSTATEMFNT, TRUSTS (1935) § 236 (c); UNIFORM
PRINcIPAL AND INCOME AcT § 5 (2). There are, however, two decisions in other states
which held that the profit derived from the sale of stock rights should be distributed to the
life tenant, so long as the intact value is maintained. It re Schnur's Estate, 32 P. (2d) 970
(Cal. 1934), (1934) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 98; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201, 66 Atl.124 (1907).
4. Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 20o (1927) ; Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa.
422, 162 Atl. 295 (1932) ; see Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 153, 14o Atl. 862,
863 (1928). The earlier Pennsylvania rule had been contra. Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264
(1877) ; Thomson's Estate, 153 Pa. 332, 26 Atl. 652 (1893) ; Veech's Estate, 74 Pa. Super.
373 (I92o), (192i) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 288. This rule followed the treatment accorded
stock dividends under the rule of Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857) . See Evans, Calculat-
ing the Distribution of a Stock Dividend between Life Temant and Corpus (1929) 77 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 981; Notes (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 618; (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 589;
(935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 773.
5. In Burton's Estate, 12 D. & C. 605 (Pa. 1929), the life tenant claimed stock pur-
chased by the trustees by exercising stock rights, less, however, the sun,. paid out of prin-
cipal, and was successful. Apparently, both sides took for granted that the corpus must
first be reimbursed before distribution of the proceeds.
6. 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 2o0 (1927), cited supra, note 4.
7. See Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 153, 14o Atl. 862, 863 (1928).
8. This distribution would be as follows:
To B: Original 1300 shares @ $91.65 (originally @ $78.60) $II9,145
Reimbursement 188 shares @ z91.65 17,230
Total 1488 shares $136,375
To A: 157 shares @ $91.65 $ 14,389
Compare supra, note 2.
9. See Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256, 259 (1870).
IO. Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 147 Atl 6o6 (i929), (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 570;
RESTA TEENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 236 (e); see Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 22o, 47 Atl.
11o8, 111o (19O); Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 479, 139 Atl. 2oo, 2o8 (1927).
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Had the trustee sold the rights, or given them to the life tenant, the distribution
suggested above would have resulted, and to permit the substantially similar
transaction in this case affect the distribution seems inequitable.
Witnesses-Privilege of Newspaper Reporter to Refuse to Disclose
Source of Information-A newspaper reporter refused to disclose to a grand
jury investigating "policy rackets" the source of his information for a published
newspaper article, which stated that despite investigation, the "racket" was
continuing. Having been committed to prison for contempt, he petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus. Held, that the writ should be refused because the re-
porter had no privilege to refrain from testifying regarding confidential com-
munications made to him. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, N. Y. L. J., Jan.
16, I936, at 273 (N. Y. 1936).
The court, emphasizing the principle that, in general, public policy and the
eradication of crime require a full disclosure of information known to wit-
nesses,1 wisely refused to make an exception when the end to be attained by the
privilege not to testify was not more socially desirable than the purpose which
supports the general rule.2 The court was unwilling to extend to reporters the
privilege granted to penal administrative officers, and as the privilege of the
latter exists only to aid in the execution of penal laws,5 this view appears to be
correct.4 To permit a reporter to refuse to reveal the source of his information
after he has published accounts of criminal activity would tend to inspire public
distrust of criminal administrative officials without assisting them to perform
their duties. Of course, publicity given to criminal activities may encourage some
police action, but in this situation the very instigator of the police then tends to
obstruct them.5 On the other hand, it is probable that sources of information
will not be readily accessible to reporters unless strict confidence is observed,(
which means that the reporter is faced with the alternative either of being sub-
ject to contempt proceedings or of suppressing all criminal news gathered from
confidential sources. However, in view of the rarity of contempt proceedings
against reporters for refusal to testify, and the questionable desirability of
investigations of crime by private persons who refuse to cooperate in its prosecu-
tion, it would seem that the extension of the privilege to newspapermen would
have been unwarranted.7
i. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d 1923) § 2286. In Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72,
84, 70 S. E. 781, 786 (191I), the court, discussing the privilege of a reporter, said: ". . . the
law requires a witness to testify, when duly summoned before a court having jurisdiction,
and called upon to give competent and relevant evidence. A promise not to testify when so
required is substantially a promise not to obey the law. . . To sustain such a doctrine
would render courts impotent and the effort to administer justice oftentimes a mockery."
2. See Note (1912) 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 583, 584.
3. See I GPEENLEa', EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) § 250; 5 WIGMO2R, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) §2374.
4. See Purrington, An Abused Privilege (i9o6) 6 COL. L. REV. 388. "Privilege, the
exception of a person or class from the common rule, if not an abuse in its inception is
proverbially sure to become one. The less there is of it under a reign of law the better."
5. However, a few states, by statute, grant this privilege to a newspaper reporter. See
for example MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby 1914), Art. 35, §:2, "No person . . . employed on
a newspaper . . .shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding . . . the source
of any news or information procured or obtained by him ,for and published in the newspaper
on and in which he is engaged, connected with or employed."
6. See Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 81, 70 S. E. 781, 785 (1911), where the re-
porter testified that the effect of his disclosing the source of his information "would ruin
me in my business. It would cause me to lose my position as a newspaper reporter . . .
and would prevent my ever engaging in the occupation of a newspaper reporter again."
7. In the companion situation, where the accused had made a statement to a journalist,
and objected to its admission on the ground that it was a confidential communication, the
court, in People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 22o, 48 P. 75, 86 (1897) overruled the objection
as meriting scarcely any comment.
